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Executive Summary
"Flash Reporting” (Paras 1-6)
1. "Flash reporting is a technique used to provide roughly accurate data
promptly enough to allow monitoring progress toward and deviations from 
targets in time to allow corrective action within the ongoing fiscal year 
and as part of the next year’s budgetary/planning process. In Tanzania 
it is used - for historic reasons - almost uniquely by the Treasury in 
respect of fiscal and macroeconomic management.
2. The failure to use "flash reporting" in respect to human and social
condition changes and performance is not unique to Tanzania. It is not - 
at least in Tanzania - based on lack of priority to these conditions but 
on an at least partially inaccurate perception that adequate, timeous
data for such "flash reporting" could not be secured, analysed and acted 
upon.
"Social and Human Condition Data for "Flash Reporting" (Paras 7-21)
3. Data on social and human conditions (broadly defined) are collected
and/or could be developed largely from data already collected. They are
not now compiled or analysed rapidly enough for ongoing progress (or
regress) monitoring nor for policy adjustment in the fiscal year or built 
into next year’s annual budgeting/planning process. The failure to do so 
is costly both at ministerial/programme and national levels. It can and
should be corrected and that correction should be of priority concern to
PM’s and Planning/Stats as well as to data generating and using
Ministries.
4. There are practical problems in selecting data relating to the conditions
to be measured, in compiling them (or samples from them) timeously and in
providing prompt analysis and policy proposals. However, these are
soluble - as, indeed, the Treasury experience with "flash reporting"
demonstrates. Key questions are what to monitor, at which levels and how 
to generate more user interest in and demand for such data.
5. Not all issues are usefully dealt with by "flash reporting". If changes 
are long run (e.g. concentration of land holding) and/or policy 
adjustment within a year is impracticable, other reporting and analysis 
systems are more appropriate. Furthermore, "flash reporting" needs to be 
backed up by more in-depth analysis and proposals for more structural 
policy changes than are possible on an in-year basis. That is, of 
course, true of its current fiscal and macroeconomic uses as of any other 
and is recognised as such by the Treasury.
"Who Should/Can Do What?" (Paras 22-33)
6. A reporting system for use as an overall progress and policy tool needs
to be operated primarily by the government and to be coordinated by one 
body fed with statistics from the bodies whose operations generate them. 
The optimal coordinating point is probably Planning albeit a case can be 
made for PM’s and a weaker one for Treasury.
7. Because Ministry (and especially Ministry statistical and planning unit) 
support in providing data timeously is vital, they need to be convinced 
that the "flash reporting" process will be useful to them for ’in-house1 
purposes and for making policy proposals inter-ministerially and via the 
ECC (including the annual budgeting/planning process). Certainly a 
powerful case for this contention exists but either most Ministries
overlook it or do not know how to act to achieve it.
"What Targets/Policies and Series?" (Paras 34-49)
8. Topics include:
a. Nutrition (especially child nutrition);
b. food supply;
c. basic consumer goods supply;
d. availability/quality of health services;
e. availability/quality of education;
f. effective access to pure water;
g. real incomes of low income groups;
h. constant price (real) government expenditure;
i. condition of transport infrastructure; 
j. levels of traffic;
k. manufacturing output.
Clearly each of these has clear social and human condition consequences 
and in each case swift changes requiring prompt policy adjustment can and 
do occur. Present data flow and analysis timing do not usually allow 
prompt, informed responses.
9. With two exceptions (f, i) the basic data to construct "flash reports" on 
these topics are collected. In a majority of cases they are compiled and 
analysed - usually up to 36 months late and often in a form not ideal for 
progress evaluation or policy reformulation.
10. A workable preliminary list of series, compilers and uses can be 
articulated and is presented in the main paper. For two cases (f, i) it 
requires new baseline surveys and/or data series which appear both highly 
desirable and practicable but will require time to set up (possibly 24 
months from a decision to act).
"Toward An Operating System” (Paras 50-56)
11. Six steps can be identified from now to a functioning social and human 
condition "flash reporting" system:
a. exploring issues of coverage and data series;
b. identifying areas best served by reporting/analysis techniques other 
than "flash reporting";
c. review of feasible buildup of system and time frame for accomplishing 
it;
d. political level decision to proceed;
e. preparing detailed operational procedures and convincing users of the 
value of their serious involvement;
f. "getting the show on the road".
"Inputs and Costs" (Paras 57-61)
12. A series of financial, material and personnel costs can be identified.
They would need to be detailed in the process set out in the previous
para. Their total is likely to be modest and external assistance is
almost certain to be mobilisable for some of them.
"Conclusion"
13. "flash reporting" can be a powerful tool for monitoring progress and
adjusting policy. In Tanzania this has been proven in the 
fiscal/macroeconomic area. It is time to extend the coverage of the 
approach to key social and human condition areas.
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"Flash Reporting": Limitations, Strengths, Uses
1. "Flash reporting" is a technique, not a goal. It is an approximate
estimation process not an accounting. What it can tell is limited in 
coverage and depth.
2. But it is the Tanzania Treasury’s strongest short term macroeconomic
monitoring tool and data input into short term policy adjustment and 
control. For those purposes what are needed are timely figures (say less 
than 30 days after the event) of the right order of magnitude and 
direction of change. They are needed for crucial variables whose changes 
matter in themselves and are likely to parallel and to influence changes 
in less readily (or rapidly) checked and more subtle or complex 
variables.
3. The "flash" of "flash report" may now suggest a computer print-out or a 
processor screen but originally was more related to a flash bulb camera 
shot banishing the dark or to a radio or telegraphic news flash. In
Tanzania its earlier variants date to the 1960s and its present 
formulation (and revival) to the mid-1970s (early 1980s). Its 
constructor and user has been the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) and, as 
a result, the basic series used have been fiscal with supplementary 
monetary and trade data and the levels of aggregation used have been 
macro (national), sectoral (e.g. crop marketing), sub-sectoral (e.g. 
NMC), ministerial and key product category (e.g. coffee or petroleum and 
products).
4. The ability of the Treasury to have estimates on performance of and 
through a given month by the end of the next month (e.g. April and
July-April Revenue by May 31) is important:
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a. to indicate what has happened including ’trends1, 'deviations’,
’turning points';
b. to contrast or compare estimated actuals with the projections on
which existing policies are based - in terms both of relative 
magnitudes and of timing (e.g. coffee exports well up on estimates 
but lagged by two months have a different set of implications than 
the same volume of exports in the months covered but with a time 
pattern as estimated together with lower total crop volumes and/or 
prices);
c. to allow adjusted (on estimated recent experience) projections for 
the balance of a fiscal or calendar or crop year (or for some other 
period as relevant, e.g. a quarter date in a Tanzania "Letter of 
Intent" to the IMF);
d. on the basis of "a" through "c" to have an information base on what 
policy changes are needed, prudent, and/or possible and their 
probable macroeconomic impact in terms of direction, orders of
magnitude and timing.
5. The belief that "flash reporting" is inherently a Treasury (or at any 
rate Ministry of Finance) concern arises from its initial roots in
Budgetary flow monitoring and control and its subsequent expansion to the 
fiscal-monetary-trade and - on occasion - production variables of 
greatest and most immediate concern to the Treasury’s short term 
macroeconomic management responsibilities. This belief is, however, 
somewhat circular. Not surprisingly Treasury has developed what is, 
after all, a technique to serve first its own narrower internal and then 
its broader policy management responsibilities. Presumably "flash 
reporting" by or for the Prime Minister's Office, Planning (whether as a 
separate ministry or as a unit in Finance and Planning which is distinct 
from the Treasury) or line Ministries would concentrate on different 
variables the data on which were relevant to their concerns. The 
question is why no such generalisation of "flash reporting" has been 
carried out (or even seriously attempted if one discounts the short 
lived, in the event counterproductive, programme and performance 
budgeting experiments of the early 1970s). Are relevant data not
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available? Would they - even if available - be irrelevant to monitoring? 
To revised projections, to policy alteration?
6. Certainly there has been an implicit assumption - not just in Tanzania -
that social and human condition data cannot be secured on a timely enough
basis with sufficient accuracy for "flash reporting". A linked but not 
identical view is that such data cannot be used to alter (fine tune?) 
sectoral policy in the same way as the macroeconomic data can to alter 
fiscal or monetary policy. Finally is is argued that without parallel 
series and analysis "flash report" data would cover such a restricted 
range as to distort policy formulation and evaluation.
Social and Human Condition Data: What Illumination Power?
7. It is sometimes asked whether social, human condition and sectoral
statistics comparable to fiscal, monetary and external trade can be
collected/recorded. This is somewhat surprising as rather large
quantities of health, education, nutrition, cost of living, local crop 
price, crop forecasts and running outturn and similar data are in fact 
already recorded and collected. In fact - Gross Domestic
Product/although macroeconomic not being a series readily "flash 
reported" - almost all of the work of Central Statistics and the
statistical work of bodies outside the Treasury-Bank of Tanzania-NBC 
nexus is concerned precisely with such statistics.
8. What is true is that many sectoral Ministries do not appear to organise 
the collection ana analysis of their own data in ways or on time scales 
particularly relevant to monitoring their own results, to introducing
intra-fiscal year corrective measures or to projecting possible future 
policy adjustments. For example, the Ministry of Transport keeps - or
used to keep - detailed records of kilometres of different grades of
roads maintained and of target as well as actual cost per kilometre and
of kilometres to be maintained per quarter. This clearly is - or could
be - the basis of an internal (ministerial) "flash reporting" system and 
- given the implications of unrepaired roads - an input into a broader 
reporting system. However, it does not appear to have been used 
systematically in the first way nor at all in the second.
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9. The question as to whether such statistics can be as "hard” as those for 
macroeconomic indicators also appears, or at least in part, to rest on 
misperceptions. Government revenue and expenditure data are indeed 
fairly "hard” (i.e. close approximations to reality) at "flash report" 
stage as are Central Bank (though not NBC) lending totals. Other 
macroeconomic data are far less complete, i.e. external trade data do not 
cover "parallel" marketing, are notoriously inexact on "no forex" licence 
imports, are (at least at "flash report" stage) very weak in respect to 
invisible (e.g. transport, communications and similar transactions) 
imports and exports. Educational institution enrollments, clinic 
attendance and morbidity breakdown and various other non-macroeconomic 
statistics are considerably "harder" than those for external trade albeit 
they tend not to be available on an interim basis within the year to 
which they relate. For that matter Cost of Living data are both "harder" 
and rapidly available than GDP estimates (which has weakened in 
estimation quality at least as badly as in per capita level).
10. Furthermore, quite what "hardness" means is hard to say unless what the 
data are supposed to indicate is specified. Monetary data, for example, 
are a rough indicator of changes in prices times quantities with serious 
difficulties in separating the two effects, in adjusting for seasonal 
factors (since the weather season is not so kind as to stick rigidly to 
the calendar) and in allowing for changes in the velocity of circulation 
of currency and/or of overall money supply. Thus the "hardness" of the
data are partly offset by the looseness of their relationship
to/indication of changes in the volume and price levels (macro or 
sectoral) for which they are indicators. Data on cases of measles (or 
measles vaccinations) based on a 10$ sample of clinics (innoculation 
points) might be "softer" in the sense of having a wider margin of error 
of estimation but would bear a closer relation to what was to be
measured/inferred, e.g. number of cases of a serious epidemic disease 
directly affecting infant and child mortality (reduction of population 
at serious risk of contracting measles in the case of vaccinations).
11. Even if actually recorded and hard enough to be useable, can social,
human and physical sectoral date be made available fast enough for "flash 
reporting" use is a more serious question. Certainly, at present, they
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rarely are. Epidemic disease data during epidemics seem to be almost the 
only exception. Nutrition, education and health data recording tends to 
outrun processing and analytical capacity and the substantial proportion 
which is processed and analysed is usually available with 6 to 36 month 
lags. In respect to agriculture the recording itself is open to doubt 
but even were it not, the delay in aggregation and the somewhat 
unexplained adjustments made to the basic data do raise questions as to 
whether timeous, "hard” data exist which must normally be answered in the 
negative.
12. However, the followup question remains valid - is the absence of timeous 
"flash” data inherent in the nature of social, human and physical 
sectoral data? The simple answer is no. The number of sources of
persons treated and morbidity recorded data, for example, is not greater
than the recording points for Ministry of Health expenditures nor are the 
number of entries to be totalled necessarily all that much greater than 
those in the overall government financial system (albeit clearly more 
numerous than for health alone barring quite eccentric fee application, 
collection and recording systems). That, unfortunately, does not 
demonstrate the practicability of ’’flash reporting” based on all the
recorded data. If to do so would require a bookkeeping, checking and
data processing capacity comparable to that in the Treasury (and other 
government financial accounting units) in the Ministries of Health and 
Education taken separately, then that (100% compilation, presentation and 
initial analysis) route is not practical on the grounds of cost, 
personnel constraints and foreseeable (much less present) data processing 
capacity.
13. Fortunately, that too is not a complete nor a final answer. Samples of 
recorded data - especially for health, education and nutrition for which 
it is most voluminous - could be drawn and compiled, analysed for "flash 
report" purposes. Rather different procedures would be needed in the 
case of agriculture in respect of which the immediate problem would seem 
to be that initial macro/regional projections, initial field level 
planting estimates, early warning estimate alterations, field level 
reviews and interim harvest (as opposed to large buyer purchase) 
estimates are not made/kept on comparable bases so that as sequential 
ongoing reporting and monitoring is practicable. Again that is a soluble
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methodological mistake resulting from different units at different times 
initiating and compiling different series for different purposes without 
overall Ministerial coordination and review (nor adequate expert advice 
from Central Statistics).
14. In short, a wide range of price, education, health (or at any rate 
illness), nutrition, water access, crop production probable ranges and 
other data could be available 20 to 45 days after the month covered (or 
where quarterly data were adequate after the quarter) with a reasonable 
degree of probable accuracy. The methods used are unlikely in most cases 
to be analogous to the 100Í recording and compiling methods used by the 
Treasury and, indeed, are likely to vary from sector to sector. If 
Ministerial and Central Statistics personnel gave priority attention 
methods could be identified and means mobilised for a select number of 
data series (or indicators).
15. Can such data be relevant to policy purposes is certainly a valid 
question. To amass a large number of series in a monthly human, social 
and physical indicators "flash report" is a waste of time if it is 
irrelevant to, or not used for, performance monitoring, policy review and 
adjustment, short term projection and/or short term (next fiscal or 
seasonal or calendar year) forward planning. However, several issues 
arise under this rubric:
a. What is to be monitored? In respect to reviewing what policies? 
(Until those questions are answered it is not possible to identify 
what data series need to be "flash reported".)
b. At what levels? Ministerial? Overall policy institutions 
(presumptively primarily PM's and Planning)? (The answers are likely 
to be different at these two levels - as are the uses made of 
government revenue and expenditure "flash reports" by the Budget, 
Revenue and Policy divisions.)
c. Why is there so little apparent user demand - especially but not only 
at Ministerial level? (Lack of knowledge of what could be made 
available? Suspicion of relating empirical data to policy? 
Disbelief in the accuracy of the data - by no means an unfounded
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concern in respect to, e.g. GDP, agriculture more generally? Sheer 
inertia baked up by overload on key officials? Belief open "flash 
reporting" would reduce Ministerial autonomy from PM’s, Planning 
and/or Treasury monitoring and coordination? The answer/answers are 
not self-evident, probably vary from case to case and need to be, at 
least, sampled before any "flash recording" generalisation exercise 
is begun to identify what type of education and advocacy campaign is 
needed.)
16. Once the goals/targets to be monitored - e.g. health (illness) levels, 
health treatment access and adequacy (re drug and/or personnel 
availability), nutrition levels, probable food supply levels, road 
condition bottlenecks, real income of selected groups (using Consumer 
Price Index, crop price/output and wage data) - are identified relevant 
data series (i.e. indicators) can be identified. On most - not all - 
cases these can be established and/or made available on a "flash report" 
basis.
17. Is a "flash report" system adequate is either answerable in the negative 
(if the question implies that nothing else is needed) or by listing its 
uses and limitations. "Flash reporting" is - virtually by definition - 
related to monitoring, projection and policy adjustment within a single 
fiscal, calendar or seasonal year, plus projections from that year as 
inputs into short term estimation/planning/targetting/policy for the 
subsequent year. It is not a medium or long term planning or budgeting 
tool nor a strategic policy formulation or choice methodology albeit it 
can provide a continuing set of reports on whether strategic targets are 
being met. Further, by itself it is usually better at indicating what is 
happening than at providing read-off answers as to why. However, by 
identifying trouble spots or trends timeously it facilitates analytical 
capacity to be concentrated promptly on identifying answers to "Why?"
18. Therefore, some key issues are not usefully dealt with by this method 
just as some data series are not appropriate to it. A good example is 
land (or land and complementary resource) concentration and access. 
There is a widespread perception that concentration is increasing and 
access narrowing. Precisely what is meant or what data series could 
measure it are rarely defined. The perception tends to be stated in
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general form but with examples drawn from a limited number of regions and 
districts. The examples cited do not on the face of it appear to be 
wholly similar processes and possibly not even ones leading to similar 
results. Whether the concentration is a restoration of the
pre-villagisation pattern (in several regions markedly more concentrated 
than the village land right allocations to households) or goes beyond it 
(actually or potentially) is equally unclear. This is an important 
question for policy (equity, income distribution, political 
participation, increasing low income rural household command over 
resources, co-op power structure, etc) determination. But it is not one 
for "flash reporting":
a. the initial need is for some type of sample census after careful 
definitions of concentration and access in terms which are both 
measurable and comparable (e.g. one hectare of land in an extensive 
ranching zone and one in an irrigated river basin area are not the 
same thing in any terms other than purely spatial);
b. such a census can hardly be repeated (even on a smaller sub-sample 
basis) monthly or quarterly. Nor need it be; changes in 
concentration do not take place on that time scale. Biannual 
sub-sample and decennial full sample reruns would probably be quite 
adequate;
c. short term macro or sectoral economic policy (let alone intra year 
adjustment to it) are, by the same token, unlikely to play a decisive 
role in directions or pace of concentration;
d. what are likely to be important are strategic policy measures, e.g. 
suppression of freehold and Nyarabanja tenure; villagisation; 
proposed limits on individual land holdings (especially in a village 
context); co-op and credit structures as they increase or decrease 
small peasant influence/access vis a vis that of co-op managers and 
large peasants. These are not determined within a year nor even 
annually - five year strategic reviews and (if perceived as necessary 
or prudent) policy changes would appear adequate.
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19. Therefore, yes "flash reporting" can be as relevant to social, human and 
physical sectoral policy as to macroeconomic and sectoral financial but 
in neither case is it adequate by itself. It is a short term and a 
marginal adjustment not a long run nor a strategic shift informing 
instrument. The latter require different types of statistical exercises 
in greater depth with (as a result) longer lags for processing and 
analyses but also at less frequent intervals.
20. There is also, however, an overlap or adaption area. Baseline or
decennial censuses are clearly not "flash report" inputs. But once a 
baseline census exists, it may be possible to draw a mini-sample and to 
do followups fairly frequently and rapidly during the intra-censual
period. The Central Statistics1 attempt to do this in respect of a
Household Budget Survey frequent report (say quarterly) system is an
example albeit a risky one given the 11 year old base HBS which was 
itself believed to be methodologically and operationally flawed compared 
to the initial 1967 one.
21. In the last analyses the reason for limited "flash reporting" coverage 
seems to be a combination of 'economic intellectual imperialism1 and 
other discipline 'passivity* quite inappropriate to Tanzanian goals or 
objective realities. Basic goals are rarely macroeconomic even though 
macroeconomic targets are likely to be critical to their attainment. 
Quantitative measurement is not limited to economic variables and, 
indeed, the relationship between certain 'non-economic' or social 
quantitative series and goal or target fulfillment is rather closer than 
is normally true for fiscal and monetary series. The overall economic 
management role of the Treasury's "flash reports" was not by any means 
planned (much less plotted); it arose out of their initial usefulness for 
the Treasury as an operational ministry and the importance of 
macroeconomic intra year management under crisis conditions on the 
positive side and the absence of comparably relevant and timeous data 
from other ministries on the negative side. The one attempt to create a 
broader array - the early 1970s Programme and Performance Budgeting 
initiative was never internalised by most ministries as useful for their 
own purposes; rather it was seen as a Treasury imposition. Further it 
turned out to be an inadequately adapted soft technology import (formal 
US export model p and p budgeting had a dismal South record) and was
>V
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finally killed off by the general reporting crisis in the Treasury 
resulting from premature and inadequately designed computerisation. What 
this history warns is the need for a new initiative to come from 
somewhere other than the Treasury and to be explained in terms resulting 
in its internalisation as useful to themselves by operating (sectoral) 
ministries and by whatever central policy ministry is the coordinating 
point for operating (sectoral) ministry reporting. It also counsels for 
greater care in being sure proposed procedures are in fact practicable 
and avoiding any triumphalist effort to introduce a complete panoply of 
indicators at one go.
Who Should/Can Do What?
22. ’’Flash reporting" as an overall policy monitoring and review tool needs 
to be coordinated and its insights deployed by a central policy 





23. The case for the Treasury is straightforward:
a. it has experience with one set of "flash reports" and their 
relatively effective use;
b. data demanded by the Treasury by and large are produced more or less 
on time with some degree of accuracy because experience has taught 
that non-cooperation carries penalties and cooperation does have 
rewards in greater Treasury understanding of and willingness to 
respond to problems beyond a Ministry’s control and/or new programme 
needs. (Afya, for example, has over the years paid a very high cost 
for perceived non-cooperation and submission of data which have 
proven to be either recklessly negligent or intentionally misleading 
whereas Elimu, Maji and Forestry have by and large enjoyed above 
average relations);
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c. the desk officers in the Treasury’s Budget Division have a fairly 
good (if uneven) grasp of what real (physical) indicators are 
relevant to assessing performance and (again unevenly) try to use 
some of them in the Annual Budget context.
24. The case against the Treasury is also straightforward:
a. the load already imposed on it by overall macroeconomic management 
plus financial sector and parastatal/ministerial financial operations 
management is very heavy indeed - adding more duties risks losing 
ability to cope (or to cope better) with those already necessarily 
resting on the Treasury;
b. a general case can be made against overconcentration of power and 
especially against concentration of short term human, social and 
physical policy monitoring and review in an economic/financial 
Ministry;
c. the Budget Division’s grasp of physical indicators is uneven and has 
never been operational on a month to month (as opposed to annual or 
one-off crisis review) basis.
d. the Policy section of the Treasury (the «conceptually logical place to 
locate the function) is not, in fact, a line unit set up to handle
large volumes of routine material and is badly overloaded.
25. The case for Planning (viewed here as institutionally and functionally
distinguishable from the Treasury even if they are, at this point in
time, under the same ministerial umbrella) is logically compelling:
a. Planning should concern itself with goals and targets in the real
world going beyond their financial representations;
b. to do this effectively it needs to go beyond the annual capital
budget (which indeed is a distraction from its logical central role), 
the Annual Plan (especially if this is primarily a monetary financial 
and short term Budget document with little real variable or 
non-financial policy analysis or emphasis) and medium term Plans
¡V
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(which are too far from each other to provide a firm base for ongoing 
policy and performance involvement);
c. coordinating and deploying social, human and physical "flash reports" 
would give Planning an ongoing role in monitoring (and presumably 
adjusting) target attainment and policy thereby providing continuity 
to the Planning process and the capacity to restore the Annual 
Planning exercise to a more comprehensive policy and resource 
budgeting role (as opposed to being a spin-off of the financial, 
credit and foreign exchange annual budgeting/planning exercise of the 
Treasury);
d. Planning is - relative to its present crucial functions - fairly well 
staffed; could set up a separate data collection - analysis - 
monitoring unit; is responsible for Central Statistics which should 
play an important advisory, and in some cases data
collection/presentation, role.
26. The case against Planning is really a review of its historic weakness
within the Tanzanian political economic planning and budgetary process:
a. Ministries do not in general take Mipango calls for reports with the 
same seriousness as those from Hazina except for data for Capital 
Budget projects because experience has taught them non-compliance or 
provision of palpably incomplete or unsound data attracts few or no 
penalties;
b. Planning has in general not involved itself in intra year monitoring, 
review and control - except at times in respect to the Capital
Budget's projects - even when structures for so doing have existed 
and Treasury would have welcomed its presence;
c. the non-feasibility of firm medium term plans (as opposed to rolling 
forward planning rapidly - i.e. at least annually - adjusted in the 
context of extreme resource stringency and economic environment 
uncertainty) since 1978 has demoralised Planning and de facto shifted 
Planning power to Treasury; not necessarily because Treasury sought
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to seize it but because someone had to exercise it and Treasury had 
done so during the somewhat comparable, but shorter, 197^-75 period.
This case suggests that building an ongoing monitoring - review - 
policy/target adjustment function into Mipango and having other 
government bodies take it seriously will not be easy. But it also 
suggests that without such an exercise Planning will remain peripheral to 
the planning process.
27. The case for Prime Minister’s is a structural or locational one:
a. Ongoing policy coordination (including new or revised policies and 
resource allocations) responsibility rests with the prime Minister 
and his Ministry;
b. An economic coordination unit for that purpose exists which - unlike 
that in the Treasury - is not burdened by a massive load of financial 
data and policy outturns to analyse and to relate to needed action;
c. in respect to Rural Development and to Local Government PM’s has some 
experience in coordinating (or setting) physical targets and
monitoring their attainment;
d. Ministries do take PM's calls for data (like those of Treasury)
seriously and tend to respond with some degree of timeliness and
accuracy.
28. However, a counter case can be made:
a. If PM’s is to coordinate "flash reporting" as a policy input, it
would be preferable if it were not also one of two main report 
sources (the other being Treasury);
b. the PM’s economic unit is (even more than the Treasury’s policy unit) 
not a line organisation with the capacity to handle a large flow of 
data and in attempting to do so could weaken its ability to analyse 
policy proposals and to advise in depth on strategic decisions;
(V
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c. the statistical and data handling expertise of Rural Development and 
Local Government have historically left a good deal to be desired. 
Arguably developing "flash reporting" on their own sector targets and 
policies is as much as can reasonably be expected of them.
Thus while on pure central authority and neat organisational chart 
grounds the case for PM's is very strong there are practical and 
decentralisation grounds for rejecting it, at least at present.
29. On balance therefore Planning - probably Nd. Mlolwa's unit - would appear
to be the most satisfactory location and PM's - Nd. Rugumisa's office - 
the alternative.
30. However, the bulk of the actual work in data collection, recording 
selection, processing and presentation plus initial analysis cannot be 
done by the coordinating body. The Treasury experience is in this sense 
misleading - financial, credit and forex data are all generated primarily 
by itself or by institutions and officers responsible to it. This would 
not be the case for the broader system envisaged here - no one Ministry 
(and especially not Planning) would generate all or even a majority of 
the series needed out of its own and its parastatals' ongoing operations.
31. Therefore, Ministry policy/planning units need to be involved in and
supportive of the social and human indicator "flash reporting" process if 
it is to work. The two arguments likely to enlist such support are:
a. "flash reporting" will enable a Ministry to monitor progress toward 
its real (physical) targets; to identify divergences rapidly and to 
seek out causes and means of improving performance within the year 
and not only when a crisis emerges or on review of the year's 
outturn. In particular such data could improve the data base for
participation in annual planning and budgeting processes which now
frequently depend on reviews of the previous fiscal year (i.e. are 18 
months out of date at the beginning of the annual exercise in
January);
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b. and will focus intra year performance and policy evaluation and 
adjustment on a broader range of data and on variables of more direct 
relevance to line Ministries' targets and activities than financial 
data alone.
32. Ministries will in practice require assistance in identifying which 
series are useful 'indicators' which can be (in full or on a sample 
basis) processed in time for "flash report" use. In some cases they are 
likely to need advice on recording and on making target and performance 
data compatible with each other. The inputs to providing such assistance 
could come from:
a. the central coordinating unit (e.g. Planning);
b. Central Statistics;
c. outside agencies with relevant specialised recording and processing 
as well as series ('indicator') indentification skills (e.g. UNICEF);
d. academic bodies with similar skills (e.g. development research and 
statistical institutes at the Universities).
33. The primary role of the academic bodies is likely to be in preparing 
baseline studies and in analysing the relationship between the data 
subject to rapid reporting and underlying goals and targets. Certainly 
they are not in any position to do primary data recording (which must in 
practice be done by operational units and/or Central Statistics) nor 
would rapid compilation and 'instant tentative analysis of data appear to 
be among their strengths. Annual reviews and specific in-depth studies 
on related issues (e.g. land concentration, women's workload/time 
allocation as a factor affecting frequency and adequacy of infant and 
young child feeding) may well be their most effective areas of 
contribution once the project/process is operational. Certainly 
intra-year policy adjustment is a very different exercise from either 
in-depth analysis or strategic policy formulation/re-formulation and one 
which historically (not just in Tanzania) has not been a particularly 




What Series - Or Rather What Targets/Policies?
34. It is tempting to start an exploration of broadening "flash reporting'1 by-
listing series (’indicators') for inclusion. That, however, is to 
overlook that it is a means and a technique not a goal or an end in 
itself - an error all too common among professional generators and 
presenters of statistical series. The starting point is to ask what 
social, human and sectoral quantitative changes (relative to the past or
to target levels) need to be (are desired to be) measured monthly or
quarterly on a "flash report" basis to monitor performance with a view to 
adjusting policy to limit, correct or reverse undesired changes. When 
that question is answered it is then appropriate to canvas what data 
series (existing or readily constructable) would service as 'indicators' 
of such changes relative to targets. Finally the questions of 
accelerated processing and presentation arise.
35. A tentative list of topics includes:
a. nutrition (especially child nutrition);
b. food supply;
c. basic consumer goods supply;
d. availability/quality of health services;
e. availability/quality of education;
f. effective access to pure water;
g. real incomes of low income groups;
h. constant price (real) government expenditure for selected sectors;
i. condition of transport infrastructure;
j. levels of traffic by rail (rail and road desirable but probably not 
estimatable at present); 
k. manufacturing output.
Additional topics can be added if up to date measurement of changes to 
allow policy/performance monitoring and policy review within the fiscal 
year is seen as important. However, ten to twelve targets/performance 
levels to be handled on a "flash report" basis is probably the largest 
practicable number to set up over an 18 to 36 month period so that 
additions should probably be balanced by deletions.
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36. Nutrition - the basic data now available are from clinic data on
children. A sample could be drawn and processed rapidly to provide a
rapid indicator of levels and direction of change. The logical compiling 
Ministry would appear to be Health.
- if the Nutrition Center could (in collaboration with Central 
Statistics) devise a small sample, approach quarterly surveys could be
conducted and processed on a flash report basis. However, to do this
would probably require a new baseline national nutritional survey.
37. Food Supply - the basic data are not currently collected in aggregated or 
easily aggregatable form. A combination of estimated (past crop year) 
and projected (current crop year) output of major grains and rootcrops 
(converted to a uniform pro-forma tonnage on a calorific basis) with 
parallel series on purchases (at co-op union level), sales, imports, and 
stocks of the same crops monthly and for the year to date set against 
target (projection) levels and the previous year’s monthly, parallel 
cumulative and final outturn results could probably be compiled on a 30 
day lag basis and would reasonably adequate indicators of staple food 
supply levels. If possible regional and major city sub-totals should be 
compiled both for internal food sector management and, in the event of 
impending food shortage, to indicate their geographic distribution. The 
logical source is Kilimo assisted by NMC and Co-op Unions.
- early warning system data (largely weather) and local market grain and 
root crop price data can be used to complement the main indicators. 
However, in the case of Tanzania late but good rains (April/May) in the 
regions North of Morogoro can make the difference between a serious 
shortage and an average food supply year so that the timing and 
discriminatory power of the ews cannot be fully adequate and separating 
crop level signals from other impacts on grain price levels is difficult 
except in years of very good or very poor harvests (either nationally or 
regionally).
38. Basic consumer goods supply would need to be based on a selected number 
of commodities, e.g. sugar, cooking oil, textiles, mabati, cement, 
kerosine, jembes, fertiliser, soap, beer and cigarettes. (Objectively 
the last two worsen the human condition, at least physically, but in fact
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they are widely consumed products whose absence clearly leads to 
discontent.) Monthly and year to date production plus imports minus 
exports set against annual targets and previous year monthly, to date and 
full year outturn data could be secured with a one month lag by the 
Ministry of Industries. In the case of soap and vegetable oil the 4 to 6 
largest plants could be used as the base to avert lags or varying 
completeness from late or missing small plant returns.
39. Availability, quality of health services requires selection, sample 
drawing and rapid processing - the amount of underlying, eventually 
processed data is immense (vide UNICEF Tanzania situation reports). 
Candidates are:
a. urban and rural attendance segregated by level of facility (treating 
hospital outpatients as urban clinic) and listing ante natal, child 
monitoring and vaccination/innoculation data separately from curative 
treatment;
b. rough indicators of adequacy of basic drug supply, equipment and 
staffing on a three category (adequate/partially adequate/inadequate) 
scale.
The data should be monthly (or at least quarterly) with year to date 
totals and also full year estimates or targets for "a" entries as well as 
previous year comparative data.
- major disease morbidity data (especially for epidemic diseases) could 
also be useful albeit possibly more for Afya than coordinated use.
- similarly Afya (and Hazina) would benefit from systematic quarterly 
unit costings by type of service (e.g. out-patient, in-patient, 
vaccination) facility level and facility with special attention to room 
and board costs for in-patient units. The differences within each class 
of units has often been up to 10 to 1 which suggests both the possibility 
of and ability to target units for better value for resources attention.
110. Availability and quality of education data also require selection, 
sampling and rapid compilation from a data universe which is very large.
1 *
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Like Afya, Elimu's data recording capacity outruns that for processing 
and there is a serious (though decreasing) lag in the latter process.
Possible indicators are:
a. primary school enrollment and attendance %;
b. adult education enrollment (divided by main types of programme) and 
attendance %;
c. secondary education enrollment for i.) Elimu, ii.) public and 
non-profit private secondary schools (e.g. IFM, Mzumbe, College of 
Accountancy, Catholic journalism school); iii.) private general 
secondary education. At present no data seem to be collected on "ii” 
which is probably of the same order of magnitude as or larger than 
"i" and "iii”!
d. rough quality indicators for ,!aM as to textbooks, basic furniture, 
non-dilapidated school structure on adequate, partially adequate, 
inadequate scale.
These data should initially be on a regional or district basis but for 
coordinated use national aggregates would also be useful. Quarterly 
reporting would on the face of it appear to be adequate with a series 
showing all quarters of the previous academic year and the current 
academic year to date together with pre-opening estimates of/targets for 
enrollment for the current academic year.
^1. Access to pure water is likely to require a baseline survey. There do 
not appear to be up to date, regularly revised estimates either of 
population actually nominally served or of % of facilities and potential 
users cut off by breakdowns or fuel shortages. Rural nominal coverage 
data appear to rely on population at time of installation without any 
clear indication of whether it was all served nor upward adjustment for 
population growth. Urban data - at least for standpipe/tap users - 
appear to suffer from the same conceptual/empirical problems. A possible 
set of series would be:
a. numbers nominally served (by region and by type of facility) based on
V \ •
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on initial census of users and adjusted quarterly for new facilities 
and estimated user population growth (say a quarter rural and 1/6 
urban as a conservative estimation process between decennial user 
censuses);
b. numbers of facilities "out" and nominal users denied effective access 
monthly ( with all months of the year to date and parallel data for 
the previous year) in absolute terms and as a % of nominal supply 
(again divided by type of facility and by region).
The latter would need to be based on a sample unless monthly full 
reporting by each District Water Officer within 10 days of the close of a 
month is practicable. The baseline survey and the two series should be 
of great value to Maji for internal management and resource allocation 
purposes. A related set of data of use to Hazina as well as Afya would 
be capital and recurrent costs per consumer served by type of facility.
42. Real incomes of low income groups would need to be compiled by Central 
Statistics or by Planning. The basic data would be:
a. Cost of Living for low income urban plus a rough index for low income 
rural;
b. Minimum and average wage;
c. Sample household budget survey urban and rural low income group 
incomes once Central Statistics has this operating.
The data on "a" (urban) are available monthly with a relatively brief 
lag. "b" is only available annually but could be roughly adjusted - at 
least at minimum wage level - when major changes occur. "c" would 
probably be available quarterly. This suggests quarterly rather than 
monthly "flash reporting".
Basically "b" divided by "a" gives a real wage index and "c" (including 
household produced and consumed goods - so-called subsistence - converted 
to cash on a price basis corresponding to the COL index used) divided by 
"a" gives real household income.
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This is an area in which initial results are likely to be fairly rough 
and ready and subsequent improvement of data needed once the system is up 
and running.
^3- Constant price government expenditure on selected sectors is a spin-off 
from existing Treasury "flash reporting series" and should be compiled by 
them. The basic conceptual problems are selecting sectors and 
identifying appropriate price deflators (not the consumer price index).
An initial sectoral list might include:
a. education (total, primary, adult);
b. health (total, primary);
c. water (urban, rural);
d. road transport (or road maintenance);
e. economic services (agriculture including livestock, fishing and
forestry, industry, commerce, energy, mining,
tourism).
The data should be reported monthly for recurrent and quarterly for
capital (so-called "development") expenditure as intra year data on the 
latter are both less accurate and less relevant to evaluating short term 
human condition changes and potential intra fiscal year policy
adjustments.
In each case an appropriate deflator would probably be: "a" (Government 
Wage/Salary Index) + "b" (COL index).
This takes into account that average pay does not necessarily move 
parallel to COL and is a high enough proportion of recurrent expenditure 
to make a straight COL deflation misleading. "a" and "b" are the
proportions of wage/salary and all other expenditure for that sector
(data which the Treasury does compile).
An operational problem relates to coverage. It should be central plus 
regional plus district/urban council spending. The first and - with 
exceptions - the second can be presented monthly for the previous month.
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In practice the last cannot. While that is itself a problem which should 
be solved, institution of a real (constant price) expenditure "flash 
report" should not wait on improving local government accounting. 
Initially reports should be based on the central and regional government 
data only with local filled in as and when available. The series should 
show "actual" for the month and the year to date, actual for the previous 
year for the comparable month, year through that month and final outturn 
plus budget target (estimate for the current year). The latter is not 
now computed but could be as the government macroeconomic policy base 
does include average government pay and COL projections.
The Treasury is interested in real levels of services provided so should 
find these series useful internally as well as for gauging real macro and 
sectoral economic performance. In addition they would simplify rolling 
three year Recurrent Budgeting’s restoration. The two future years could 
initially be estimated at the current year's prices/wages and targetted 
real increases and then adjusted each January (at the start of the 
subsequent budgetary process) to take into account actual past and 
projected wage and price increases.
44. Condition of transport infrastructure may require a baseline survey or 
data may exist either in compiled or disaggregated form. What is needed 
are totals (by kilometre) for highways and roads (by the operational 
categories from tarmac highways through district roads) and for railways 
characterised as:
a. in good condition;
b. requiring standard maintenance;
c. requiring standard and catchup on deferred maintenance;
d. requiring reconstruction but still passable;
e. "out".
The monthly (quarterly reports would show kilometres of normal 
maintenance, normal plus deferred maintenance and reconstruction carried 
out (with standard annual target and previous year comparison data). 
These should exist now - at least in disaggregated form - for ministerial 
management purposes but they may no longer be kept and/or compiled 
promptly and it is not clear whether detailed annual targets are set (as
* * •
-23-
they certainly should be). An additional quarterly report should update 
the opening condition reports to take account of maintenance/new 
condition reports/disasters.
M5. Transport traffic '’flash reporting” would be highly valuable in 
identifying bottlenecks and their buildup in time to minimise them. 
Unfortunately no useable base data (or flow data for that matter) exist 
on lorry fleet numbers, capacity and condition nor on total road haulage 
by route and commodity (or overall) on an annual and season tonne 
kilometre and tonne basis. Central Statistics and Transport should be 
instructed to set up a data base including first steps toward such series 
but definition, formulation of ways and means, institution and running-in 
is likely to take at least 2 years from the initial decision to build up 
the data base (or the arrival of a technical cooperation person if - as 
is possible - Transport's Planning Unit and Central Statistics do not 
have adequate in-house capacity).
- railway traffic data exist. In principle monthly totals (by line and 
direction) for tonnage, tonne and cargo type could be provided on a 
’’flash report" basis in the usual format of current month, year to date, 
initial target or projection for year, previous year - or years - 
monthly, year through month and final outturns. This should give some 
insight into traffic levels and improvements or worsenings because 
effective rail capacity if far below past useage levels so that as it 
increases more traffic will be hauled freeing lorries for routes not 
served by rail. If quarterly data on traffic refused (no space) could be 
provided timeously (they are compiled) this would reinforce the 
"indicator" value of the series.
- a comparable set of data are needed in respect to the three major ports 
with backup data by user country (i.e. Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Other 
SADCC, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda). In this case data are needed not 
only on uncleared cargo but days delay (or no delay) on vessels beginning 
discharge/loading. The policy adjustment needs most likely to require 
urgent action on this data are those relating to Tanzania's role as an 
FLS port state and Eastern Zaire’s logical ocean access when routes from
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it to RSA ports are closed. The concept of shifting Tanzanian cargo to 
Mtwara and Tanga is partly plausible but without "flash report" data 
when, what, where, how much are questions almost impossible to answer 
both accurately and promptly.
These two areas are ones for Transports’s Planning Unit (using Tazara, 
Rail and Harbours corporation data) to report on. The value of the 
series to their ministerial operations should be considerable so that a 
positive response can be anticipated if any needed technical support is 
provided.
46. Crop and Crop Input Traffic and Backlog are at the core of the transport 
problems. The data on which to build "flash reporting" does exist but is 
so scattered that compilation is at present not simply slow but ad hoc 
and of doubtful accuracy. Further, apparently two Ministries (PM’s and 
Agriculture) would need to be involved neither of which appears to focus 
on the transport bottleneck as its own concern (as opposed to a problem 
for it to raise) nor to be very successful in collecting data from units 
responsible to it (co-op societies and unions, crop marketing boards) 
accurately and/or promptly.
The report needed (monthly) would include by main crop:
a. primary co-op purchases, shipments, in stock
b. co-op union (including TFA, the "kulak" parallel union) collections, 
sales, in stock
c. marketing board/NMC purchases, sales, in stock unsold, in stock 
awaiting export.
To get these data PM's (Co-op Division) would need to put real pressure 
on primary societies, unions to report via District and Regional Officers 
to PM’s by 15 days after the close of each month. Kilimo would need to 
do the same with respect to its relevant parastatals - nominally much 
easier, but - given the state of many board’s recording systems and 
Kilimo’s history of confusing overseeing the boards with overlooking 
their failings - probably no less hard in practice. Indeed it is
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possible Planning (using Hazina authority) should collect the data from 
the Boards/NMC and coordinate it with that from PM's (Co-operative 
Division) by-passing the overseeing data collection and reporting 
shambles in MDB/Planning at Kilimo until Kilimo can set its system and 
processes in working order.
These data would show with great clarity where backlogs were building up 
(given the initial recording points regional and district sub-totals 
could be broken out of the national aggregates) and at what levels. This 
would flag needs for transport redeployment. It would also highlight the 
need for adequate village level storage so that crops could be moved out 
(and inputs in) on a year-round basis not piled up in chaotic seasonal 
peaks.
- a parallel exercise could be done for fertiliser on a monthly basis 
with estimated yearly (delivery year basis) total and monthly plus 
cumulative production plus imports, shipments to up-country godowns, 
deliveries to villages and location of produced or imported but not yet 
at village stocks. For the time being Industries may be in the best 
position to produce this series using data from TFC, Trade and 
Agriculture.
For these series to affect policy and practice there is need for a single 
Ministry to be responsible for taking the lead in bottleneck breaking and 
for coordinating action by other Ministries, Co-ops, Enterprises 
(including, if necessary knocking heads together). The main direct 
actors are:
a. Transport (plus TRRC, THC, Tazara)
b. Co-op Division PM's
c. Kilimo (plus Crop Boards/NMC)
d. Industry (plus TFC)
e. Nishati (if fuel availability is part of the problem)
If the Chairman is to be from this group it should be the PS or 
Commissioner for Planning of Transport. However, a case exists for PS or 
senior "Advisor"/"Personal Assistant" from PM's Chairing as the issues 
are both crucial and genuinely trans-sectoral.
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47. Manufacturing output reporting could be the same basic data as basic 
consumer goods availability excluding imports and exports and adding up 
to five more products (e.g. petroleum refining, soft drinks, foundry 
products, aluminium and steel pipe, iron rods). The purpose would be to 
give an up-to-date feel for manufacturing output trends (a serious gap at 
present) and the providing Ministry would be Industries.
48. These eleven sets of reports would go a very long way toward providing an
adequate data base for short term target/performance monitoring and 
policy review. They are somewhat broader than social and human condition 
indicators per se but do encompass the basic data needed to illiminate 
trends and levels in those areas.
49. Introducing them will not be easy, overnight or costless. A strategic
decision to do so (after consultation) would probably need the backing of 
an ECC or Cabinet decision to ensure compliance and would need
articulated, phased steps to implementation. The scarcest resource is
likely to be professional specialist personnel. Available capacity in
Tanzania (including in co-operating agencies such as UNICEF and the 
Universities) should be assessed at an early stage. If gaps or
inadequate total numbers are identified, a technical assistance project 
to provide the personnel plus equipment for compiling and processing the 
data should be drawn up with Sweden and/or CFTC the most likely target 
donors.
Toward An Operating System
50. Several overlapping stages/elements are involved in moving to a "flash
reporting" system broader than fiscal/macro monetary:
a. exploring what needs to be covered and what series ("indicators") 
would provide reasonably adequate, timely coverage;
b. building up parallel lists of areas requiring more in-depth and less 
frequent studies;
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c. an in-house technical review by government economic/statistical 
personnel on what might be feasible over what time frame;
d. political level discussions to confirm interest in results of "c” 
(can assume interest from stated goals and resource allocations) and 
to formulate action plan to be adopted by ECC/Cabinet;
e. identifying operational procedures for items from "a” and ”b" and 
’selling’ same to intended producers/collectors,
coordinators/analysers and users of data;
f. "getting the show on the road".
51. The present UNICEF convened advisory group clearly has a useful role to 
play in respect to "a" and "b" and potentially in the operation of "b".
52. "c" would appear to need a core group of Wd. Rugumisa, Kipokolo, Mlolwa, 
and a senior Central Stats officer. They might wish to consult 
planning/stats (not necessarily same people) personnel from most involved 
Ministries including Health, Education, Agriculture, Water, Transport, 
Industry and Treasury as well as selected non-government expertise, e.g. 
Nd. Leach, Nd. Van Arkadie (who seems to be loosely involved in a 
partially parallel "early reporting" proto project). The basic decisions 
on what to present to (initially) PM and MF and - subject to their 
concurrence and/or amendment - more broadly need to be taken by this core 
group.
53. "d" is the political level decision-taking process which would presumably 
be informed by technical consultations at "c" stage against background of 
Party and government human and social condition goals and targets. The 
more the ministry personnel see proposed "flash reporting" as useful to 
them in-house at their own ministries, the easier this process will be 
and, perhaps more crucial (PM’s and Hazina could probably push it through 
the ECC on their own) the better the cooperation on implementation.
54. As discussed above, prompt receipt of useable data from government bodies 
can be achieved only if to a credible government body and under authority 
of an ECC/Cabinet decision. The ideal place (or most nearly ideal) is
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probably Nd. Mlolwa's shop with Nd. Rugumisa as second choice. Analysis 
should in the long run be in the same shop to save time and link directly 
to policy concerns. If this is not initially possible then ERB (Drs. Van 
Arkadie/Tibaijuka) might be sub-contracted for an interim period. IDS 
(Dar) is unlikely to wish to do this "quick and nasty" type of "instant 
analysis" nor to do it well. It may have a comparative advantage on 
certain longer term variables' analysis (e.g. land and other resource 
access concentration). The Economics Department might be used in certain 
of these areas too - e.g. income distribution patterns and shifts (Dr.
Wagao in association with Central Stats). UNICEF (Nd. Leach) might be
able to assist with initial advisory work with and assistance to Health 
and Nutrition.
55. As soon as 2 or 3 series are coming in, regular monthly reports from
Planning should be begun. These presumably would go to PM, MF, Health, 
Education, Water, Agriculture, Transport (via their Policy/Planning 
Units) as a matter of course. How they should lead to action (monthly 
discussion at PS level? action proposals to ECC? ministerial committee
chaired by PM or one of his Ministers of State - or by MF or his Minister
of State/Junior Minister for Planning? - as a quicker action format?) is 
for consideration.
56. The above comments are not meant to denigrate the UNICEF initiated
consultations but to suggest:
a. they are only part of the process;
b. they seem to rely too heavily on academic body involvement in actual
data collection/analysis in ways almost sure to be inconsistent with 
adequate speed and adequate government feeling of "immediacy" (i.e. 
own material for action).
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Inputs/Costs and All That
57. In the course of "c" and "e" it will be possible to identify:
a. advisory personnel needed for design and installation;
b. permanent personnel needed for operation;
c. equipment (e.g micro-processors) needed for operation;
d. approximate recurrent costs "in house";
e. costs of academic institution supporting studies.
58. Many of "a" and "b" should already be in place (our statistical personnel 
have a rather low output per person level for reasons partly beyond their 
control including lack of defined priority data to produce). Some 
additions will be needed and some training:
a. Nordics and Netherlands and/or CFTC would probably supply personnel 
and finance for training;
b. the Institute and the Department (of Stats) at the University should 
be able to provide training.
59. Probably Nordics, Netherlands, perhaps (on Health, Nutrition) UNICEF
would finance equipment if more is needed. The recurrent budget costs
should be low enough (beyond expert personnel) to be financed within the
Budget.
60. The academic institute studies could be financed on the Budget (in the 
long run should be) but initially perhaps SIDA/SAREC or Nordic parallels 
or (for some topics) UNICEF or UNESCO would provide support.
61. I am not self-evidently a priority input - except perhaps in advice to 
core group of "e" of Para 50. I am not a statistical procedure expert 
and most of what I think I know about "flash reporting" and "social and 
human condition" policy oriented review appears in this memo. But if I 
am thought useful I can probably be in Tanzania either early February or 
early to mid-March for a few days to a week. Probably this can be
-30-
* %
largely fitted in to other trips so far as tickets go but if "X" (whether 
UNICEF or A. N. Other) would cover per diems and a fee (which IDS gets 
not me) this would be helpful albeit not absolutely essential.
Conclusion
62. "Flash reporting" is a means of using timely, approximate data to review
intra-year performance in relation to goals and to make policy
adjustments when the data indicate they are needed. In Tanzania "flash 
reporting" has been first an in-house Hazina and subsequently also a
Hazina deployed fiscal, monetary, macroeconomic management of some power.
6 3. Human and social targets are prominent in Tanzania’s policy goals.
Reporting on progress has tended to be imprecise and late. This hinders 
target attainment and timely policy monitoring, review and adjustment. 
"Flash reporting" should and could be extended to cover these aspects of 
public policy and targets.
6M. Procedural, locational and data selection issues are real but inherently
manageable. A system is desirable (in terms of Tanzania’s own goals) and
if priority is given could be put into operation (at least in part for 
fiscal 1988/89) at manageable personnel and financial cost. The present 
author strongly recommends that this be done.
-RHG
Falmer
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